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Rothman: Beyond the Cloud

BEYOND THE CLOUD: WHY THE NARROW DECISION IN
AMERICAN BROADCASTING COS. V. AEREO, INC. MAY HAVE
BROADER IMPLICATIONS FOR CLOUD-COMPUTING
Robyn L. Rothman*

I.

INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court’s decision in American Broadcasting
Cos. V. Aereo Inc. (Aereo)1 invites meaningful discussion about how
legal provisions in the Copyright Act of 1976 should be applied to
new and emerging technologies. In particular, Internet based storage,
commonly known as “Cloud Services,” now runs the risk of copyright infringement based upon the decision in Aereo.
At the time of the decision, the Court cautioned that its holding should be construed narrowly to the facts of the case. However,
because the Court decided against employing an analysis of the technology, the decision reached by the Court created negative implications for new emerging companies that employ similar systems.2
Thus, this holding could have potentially profound effects on both
*
J.D. Candidate 2016, Touro College, Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center; B.A. 2012, City
University of New York at Queens College. Special Thanks: To Professor Rena Seplowitz
for all of her guidance and encouragement throughout my law school career and on this paper. To the Touro Law Review Editorial Board for believing in my paper and all of the
countless hours of hard work spent on the editorial process. To my father, William F. Rothman, Esq., I am eternally grateful for your love and guidance, you are my inspiration, and I
am, and always will be proud to be your daughter. To my mother, Marcia Fox-Rothman, I
would not be the woman I am today without your strength, love and patience to guide me
and I am forever thankful. To my boyfriend, Ian Exner, for your unconditional love and encouragement over the last 10 years. To my sister, Hayley Rothman-Di Rico, my grandmothers, Roslyn Fox and Gladys Milgraum, I am forever thankful for your love and support. This
paper is in loving memory of my uncle, Edward W. Fox, I know how proud you were for my
progress in school, I know you would have been even more proud of this paper, and Papa
Stanley Milgraum, your love is felt even in your absence, I know you would have loved this
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1
134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014).
2
Id. at 2511.
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current and emerging cloud-based technologies, as Aereo’s system
was designed to create user specific private performances.3
Part I will discuss the history of the current Copyright Act and
its evolutionary application to modern advances in television and
broadcasting technology. It will also focus on the complexity and
ambiguity of language within the Transmit Clause of the Copyright
Act of 1976,4 examine how said language has caused varying interpretations of the document, and determine how those varying interpretations have led to legal complications within the growing techindustry. Part II will describe the specific operation of Aereo’s system and the function of “the Cloud,” while also examining the history
and evolution of the Public Performance right leading to the creation
of the Transmit Clause. Part III will investigate the litigation Aereo
faced, as it was alleged that Aereo had infringed upon the Network
Broadcaster’s exclusive right to publicly perform their copyrighted
works, while also describing Aereo’s use of the Cloud and how
Cloud technology works.
Parts IV and V of this paper will outline the Aereo litigation
from the Southern District of New York through the Supreme Court.
Finally, Part VI will argue in-depth how the Aereo decision will potentially impact current and emerging cloud-based technologies and
examine exactly why the prevailing application of the Transmit
Clause, as was done in Aereo, will both enormously alter modern
technology, and possibly stifle America’s technological innovation in
the future.
II.

THE PUBLIC PERFORMANCE RIGHT AND THE TRANSMIT
CLAUSE

It has been a longstanding principle that artists, scientists, and
innovators should be afforded adequate protections of their works
without hindering advancement and progress in their respective
fields.5 Federal copyright law was born from the belief that Congress
has the ability to promote the progress of the arts and sciences while
simultaneously affording adequate protections to authors, artists, and
3
Mark P. McKenna, The Limits of the Supreme Court’s Technological Analogies, SLATE
(June 26, 2014, 12:07 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2014/06/
abc_v_aereo_ruling_the_supreme_court_s_terrible_technological_analogies.single.html.
4
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2010).
5
A Brief Introduction and History, UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT OFFICE,
http://copyright.gov/circs/circ1a.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2016).

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol32/iss2/8

2

Rothman: Beyond the Cloud

2016

BEYOND THE CLOUD

277

inventors.6 When the Continental Congress included this principle in
Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the Constitution, several states had
already enacted copyright statutes.7 Shortly after the ratification of
the Constitution in 1790, the original version of the Copyright Act
was passed in the second session of the first Congress.8 This most
primitive version of the 1790 Copyright Act allowed for the right of
reproduction and distribution of only “maps, charts, and books,” but
has since been amended several times over 180 years to include a
more comprehensive listing of rights for other forms of artistic and
scientific works.9
For the purposes of this paper, the most significant modification to the 1790 Copyright Act was in 1856, when the right of “public
performance” of dramatic works was amended into the statute.10 This
particular 1856 amendment granted the copyright holder of a dramatic work the “sole right to . . . act, perform, or represent the same,
or cause it to be acted, performed, or represented, on any stage or
public place . . . .”11 This change gave the copyright holder the ultimate control over the work in all aspects, if the public were to see,
view, or hear the copyrighted work, it was at the sole discretion of the
copyright holder.
Another important alteration to the document came in 1897,
when the Act was amended to include punishment for an unlawful
public performance of a dramatic or musical composition in the form
of monetary damages or imprisonment.12 If the public performance
of the work was “willful and for profit,” the person found in violation
would receive the latter form of punishment.13
The Act was again revised in early 1909 to list the four exclusive rights copyright owners held in Section 1.14 Thus, the 1909
Copyright Act became the first to distinguish between dramatic
works and musical works under the public performance right.15
6

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
Benjamin W. Rudd, Notable Dates in American Copyright 1783-1969, 28 Q.J. LIBR.
CONGRESS 137, 138 (1971), http://www.copyright.gov/history/dates.pdf.
8
Id. at 138.
9
Id.
10
Id. at 139.
11
U.S. Copyright Amendment Act of 1856, ch. 169, 11 Stat. 138.
12
U.S. Copyright Amendment Act of 1897, ch. 4, 29 Stat. 481-82.
13
Id.
14
Copyright Act of 1909, 17 U.S.C. § 1(a)-(e) (1909).
15
Copyright Act of 1909, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1(d), (e) (1909).
7
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However, the 1909 Copyright Act provided that a public performance
occurs regardless of whether the work was performed in part or in
whole, yet never expressly defined what constitutes to the “public” or
to perform such a work “publicly.”16 The absence of any language
establishing when a performance of a work becomes public has proven to be a serious difficulty for courts when dealing with the infringement of the public performance right.17
Even further, technological advancements in television broadcasting in the mid-twentieth century exposed the 1909 Copyright
Act’s ambiguity in regard to “performing,” and doing so “publicly.”
For example, the emergence of “community antenna television systems,” or CATV systems,18 in the 1960s enabled broadcast signals to
reach large groups of the population that were previously unable to
receive those broadcasts due to mountainous terrain obstructing
broadcast reception.19 Advancements in CATV technology allowed
one large antenna to retransmit one television broadcast signal to all
of the company’s paid subscribers through a series of coaxial cables.20 The user was then charged a monthly fee to watch the broadcasts instead of not being able to watch television broadcasts at all, or
having to install antennas above their homes to gain reception of television broadcasting.21 More modernly known as cable television,
this new technology created a network that allowed television broadcasting to reach even the most remote regions of the United States.22
At the height of this monumental advancement in broadcast
technology, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in
two cases. In both cases, network television providers alleged that
the CATV systems infringed upon their exclusive right to perform
16

Id.
Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 396-402 (1968), superseded by statute, Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 95-553, 90 Stat. 2541, as recognized in American Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014); Teleprompter Corp. v.
Columbia Pictures Broad. Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394, 410-14 (1974), superseded by statute,
Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 95-553, 90 Stat. 2541, as recognized in American Broad.
Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014).
18
See Cable Television, BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/technology/cabletelevision#ref262049 (last visited Mar. 29, 2016) (CATV systems are more modernly known
as cable television systems).
19
Fortnightly, 392 U.S. at 392.
20
Id.
21
Id. at 392-93.
22
John P. Cole, Community Antenna Television, the Broadcaster Establishment, and the
Federal Regulator, 14 AM. U. L. REV. 124, 125-27 (1965).
17
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their copyrighted works publicly. In 1968, the Court in Fortnightly
Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc.,23 determined that these new
CATV systems merely enhanced viewer function because viewers
did not necessarily “perform” in terms of the 1909 Copyright Act.24
In other words, at this time, a viewer of a television broadcast did not
facilitate the act of performing. Since CATV systems allowed a new
set of viewers to watch these broadcasts, there was no performance.
While many early televisions were able to pick up signals that were
within a certain distance, many times additional equipment such as a
signal boosting antenna or an Ultra High Frequency (UHF) converter
was needed to improve reception of local and/or further broadcast
signals.25 Nevertheless, in certain areas of the country, such a signal
was still nearly impossible to obtain, even with the most advanced
home television equipment.26 As far as the system in Fortnightly was
concerned, viewers in those parts of the country who could not receive the signal, or received a faint signal, could now fully obtain
these signals through their coaxial cable connected to the larger
community antenna.27 Thus, the Court in Fortnightly concluded that
this new form of equipment was an enhanced form of what the viewers were already lawfully allowed to do.28
The Court then reaffirmed this position six years later in 1974
with Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.29
While the CATV system in Fortnightly enabled viewers to receive
signals within local broadcast areas, the system in Teleprompter enabled viewers outside the local broadcast signal area to receive these
same signals.30 The Court found this distinction to be of no consequence.31 The Networks argued that extending the signals beyond the
local broadcast area would significantly reduce retransmission fees to

23

392 U.S. 390, 399 (1968).
Id. at 398-99 (“Broadcasters perform. Viewers do not . . . . Essentially, a CATV system no more than enhances the viewer’s capacity to receive the broadcaster’s signals; it provides a well-located antenna with an efficient connection to the viewer’s television set.”).
25
Roberto Baldwin, The History of the Set-Top Box: From Bunny Ears to Apple TV,
WIRED (Jan. 18, 2016), http://www.wired.com/2013/03/set-top-box-history-gallery-draft/.
26
The Cable History Project, THE CABLE CENTER, http://cablecenter.org/cablehistory/108-the-cable-history-project-overview.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2016).
27
Fortnightly, 392 U.S. at 392.
28
Id. at 399.
29
415 U.S. 394 (1974).
30
Id. at 399-400.
31
Id. at 413-14.
24
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secondary markets.32 Ultimately, the Court found this argument unpersuasive and reiterated that CATV systems did not perform publicly because they were an enhancement of the viewer function, as reasoned in Fortnightly.33 Under the Court’s interpretation, viewers did
not publicly perform at all.34 A viewer was well within his or her
right to receive the network broadcast signal and watch television in
the comfort of his or her own home.35 Thus, if the CATV systems
only enhanced the viewer experience, these systems did not perform.36
The Court’s hesitance to compromise the exclusive rights held
by the Networks and the functions of the CATV systems in both
Fortnightly and Teleprompter was due in part to pending legislative
proceedings to amend the 1909 Copyright Act.37 These proposed
amendments finally came to fruition in 1976 when Congress enacted
the current version of the Copyright Act.38 This new and significant
overhaul of the Copyright Act sought to encompass actions of CATV
systems. The Act deemed these systems as infringing upon the exclusive rights enumerated under §106.39 Congress then enacted lan32

Id. at 410-11.
When a copyright holder first licenses a copyrighted program to be
shown on broadcast television, he typically cannot expect to recoup his
entire investment from a single broadcast. Rather, after a program has
had a ‘first run’ on the major broadcasting networks, it is often later syndicated to affiliates and independent stations for ‘secondary run’ propagation to secondary markets. The copyright holders argue that if CATV
systems are allowed to import programs and rechannel them into secondary markets they will dilute the profitability of later syndications,
since viewer appeal, as measured by various rating systems, diminishes
with each successive showing in a given market.

Id.

33
34
35
36
37
38
39

Teleprompter, 415 U.S. at 403.
Id. (quoting Fortnightly, 392 U.S. at 398).
Id. at 400-01.
Id. at 403.
See Fortnightly, 392 U.S. at 401; see also Teleprompter, 415 U.S. at 414, n. 16.
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476 at 47 (1976); 17 U.S.C. § 101; 17 U.S.C. § 111.
Exclusive Rights in Copyrighted Works 17 U.S.C. § 106:
(1) Subject to sections 107 through 122, the owner of copyright under this title has the
exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following: to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale
or other transfer or ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes,
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guage, which not only defined when a performance is “public,” but
also encompassed the activities of the CATV systems.40 Specifically,
subsection (2) of the definition of “public performance,” aptly named
the “Transmit Clause,” afforded an alternative way to publicly perform a work through transmission (or retransmission) of a copyrighted work, by a signal or broadcast in one public place or multiple public places by any device or means capable of doing so.41
The addition of the Transmit Clause subsequently became a
subject of highly contested debate. Since its inclusion in the Copyright Act, several cases have analyzed what constituted a transmission of a “public” or “private” performance. Many early cases attempted to reason that if an entity played the same copy of the
underlying work in a public place or to many groups of people at different times in a public place this would be considered a “public performance” of the copyrighted work.42 For example, in Columbia Pictures Indus. v. Redd Horne, Inc.,43 a video rental store allowed
customers to watch a copy of a movie which was transmitted from
the front of the store, where the video cassette player was held, to the
back of the store, where individual viewing booths were housed.44
The Third Circuit court concluded that the defendant’s movie rental

40

and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work
publicly;
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes,
and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual images of a
motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work publicly; and
(6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work publicly by
means of a digital audio transmission.
17 U.S.C. § 101 To perform or display a work “publicly” means:

(1) to perform or display it at a place open to the public or at any place where a substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of family and its social acquaintances is gathered; or
(2) to transmit or otherwise communicate a performance or display of the work to a
place specified by clause (1) or to the public, by means of any device or process,
whether the members of the public capable of receiving the performance or display
receive it in the same place or in separate places and at the same time or at different times.
41
Id.
42
On Command Video Corp. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 777 F. Supp. 787 (N.D. Cal.
1991); Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008); Fox TV
Stations, Inc. v. BarryDriller Content Sys., PLC, 915 F. Supp. 2d 1138 (C.D. Cal. 2012); Fox
TV Stations, Inc. v. FilmOn X LLC, 966 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2013).
43
749 F.2d 154 (3d Cir. 1984).
44
Columbia Pictures Indus., 749 F.2d at 157.
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store was publicly performing when it would transmit the same copy
of the work to different members of the public at different times.45
Similarly, the district court for the Northern District of California
deemed a hotel was publicly performing when its video-on-demand
system would show the same copy of the work to its patrons.46
The Second Circuit Court has provided arguably one of the
most significant interpretations of the Transmit Clause, having drawn
from both the Third Circuit Court and the Northern District of California Court cases. In Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc.,47
the Second Circuit found that the Remote Storage Digital Video Recorder (RS-DVR) technology did not infringe upon the broadcaster’s
exclusive public performance right.48 The RS-DVR technology allowed subscribers of Cablevision to record shows for later viewing.49
While the RS-DVR was similar to the traditional set-top DVR system
that would record shows upon user demand,50 the new RS-DVR was
housed in a central unit controlled by Cablevision and the user had
the RS-DVR software installed in the set-top cable box.51 When Cablevision received a signal (the original transmission) from the
broadcasters, the signal would split between a “live viewing function” and “record function.”52 Each single viewer received his or her
own personal copy from the second “record” function stream. In other words, no two users had access to the same copy of a recorded
show.53
The Second Circuit developed four guideposts to determine
when a transmission is considered “public” or “private.”54 First, the
court looked to “who was capable of receiving the transmission.”
Here, a transmission is private if the particular transmission is capable of being viewed by one individual, whereas, it is public if the
transmission or retransmission is capable of being viewed by a much
larger audience than the normal “family circle and its acquaintances”

45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54

Id. at 162.
On Command Video Corp., 777 F. Supp. at 789.
536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008).
Cartoon Network LP, 536 F.3d at 139-40.
Id. at 124.
Id. at 125.
Id. at 124.
Id. at 124-25.
Cartoon Network LP, 536 F.3d at 126.
Id. at 134-39.
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as defined in § 101.55 Second, private performances could not be
grouped together (or aggregated), as this would frustrate the purpose
of the Transmit Clause.56 This non-aggregation theory, as discussed
further in this article, suggests that even if multiple private performances are created by one singular entity, this does not infringe upon
the public performance right.57
Third, aggregation should only occur if private performances
to members of the public in general, or members of the public in a
public place, are being created from the same copy of the work.58
Fourth, in walking through the Transmit Clause analysis, “any factor
limiting the potential audience of a transmission is relevant.”59 In
other words, any entity creating multiple performances ensures there
is no infringement if proper steps are taken to actively prohibit the
audience of any given transmission to remain within the threshold of
the “normal family circle and its acquaintances.”60 This allowed
Aereo to prevail in both the District Court for the Southern District of
New York and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.61
However, two other courts found this long accepted reasoning
unpersuasive. In Fox TV Stations v. BarryDriller Content Sys.,62 the
district court for the Central District of California ruled that an Internet based television system infringed upon the public performance
right.63 This case held that a performance of a work is considered
55
56

Id. at 134.
Id. at 135-36.
We cannot reconcile the district court's approach with the language of
the transmit clause. That clause speaks of people capable of receiving a
particular ‘transmission’ or ‘performance,’ and not of the potential audience of a particular ‘work.’ Indeed, such an approach would render the
‘to the public’ language surplusage. Doubtless the potential audience for
every copyrighted audiovisual work is the general public. As a result,
any transmission of the content of a copyrighted work would constitute a
public performance under the district court's interpretation. But the
transmit clause obviously contemplates the existence of non-public
transmissions; if it did not, Congress would have stopped drafting that
clause after ‘performance.’

Id.

57

See Section V, infra.
Cartoon Network LP, 536 F.3d at 137-38.
59
Id. at 137.
60
Id. at 134.
61
American Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 874 F. Supp. 2d 373, 404 (S.D.N.Y. 2012);
WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676, 680 (2d Cir. 2013).
62
915 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1146 (C.D. Cal. 2012).
63
Fox TV Stations, Inc., 915 F. Supp. 2d at 1146.
58
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public when an entity retransmits the performance of the underlying
work to members of the public, irrespective of whether users are
watching individualized copies or transmissions of the work.64
This same conclusion was reached by the District Court for
the District of Columbia in Fox TV Stations, Inc. v. FilmOn X.65 This
apparent split between Transmit Clause interpretations prompted the
Supreme Court to grant certiorari to ABC, CBS, NBC, and the other
Plaintiff Networks in their appeal of the Second Circuit decision in
WNET v. Aereo.66
III.

THE AEREO AND THE CLOUD
A.

Analysis of “the Cloud”

Modern Cloud computing, known affectionately as “the
Cloud,” is a service that allows for the storage of data over the Internet instead of on a computer’s hard drive.67 Third-party companies
that house data centers, or hard drives in a separate location from the
user also run the “Cloud.”68 These off-site hard-drives are connected
to an entire network, allowing paying subscribers to then access these
remote hard drives from almost anywhere and from any Internet capable device.69 For example, Apple Inc. offers one of the more
commonly used cloud computing services today, aptly named,
iCloud.70 Every Apple device and service user has access to Apple’s
iCloud, which will store anything saved to a user’s iTunes account or
Apple device.71 Each Apple device user has an iTunes account which
stores information such as music purchased via the customers iTunes
account, pictures, documents, phone numbers, etc.72 While all iTunes
users are allotted a certain amount of iCloud storage space, users al64

Id.
966 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2013).
66
Aereo Inc., 134 S. Ct. at 2504.
67
Eric Griffith, What is Cloud Computing?, PC MAGAZINE (Apr. 17, 2015),
http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2372163,00.asp.
68
Id.
69
What is Cloud Computing?, IBM, http://www.ibm.com/cloud-computing/what-iscloud-computing.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2016).
70
iCloud, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/icloud/ (last visited Mar. 3, 2016).
71
Id.
72
Id.
65
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ways have the option of either deleting files or purchasing more
space on iCloud for a small monthly fee.73 Additionally, no two users have access to the same storage space. Accessing an iCloud account is a completely private and password-protected experience.74
Businesses of all sizes use cloud services as means to store
hundreds of thousands of pieces of data electronically75 It is more efficient for businesses to store, organize, and protect sensitive documents via a third-party Cloud-based system. As opposed to handling
paper filing systems that can be stolen, lost, or assume an exuberant
amount of office space.76 “The Cloud” has been proven to be a more
convenient for people to store data than the conventional methods
that preceded it. Therefore, more companies are beginning to work
with the cloud model.77
B.

Aereo and Its Process

Aereo was an American Internet-based television provider,
which allowed users to watch broadcast television without having to
subscribe to a cable or satellite bundle package.78 For a small monthly fee customers had the ability to watch broadcast television via any
Internet-capable device.79 At the time of litigation, Aereo was only
available to customers in the New York Metropolitan area.80 Currently, Aereo has ceased operations and has filed for Chapter 11
Bankruptcy.81 However, in an interesting twist, Aereo has been acquired by TiVo, which plans to release a similar product claiming to
be the legal alternative to Aereo.82
Aereo developed a system of tiny dime-sized antennas housed
73

Id.
Id.
75
Uses of Cloud Computing, APPRENDA, https://apprenda.com/library/cloud/uses-ofcloud-computing/ (last visited Mar. 29, 2016).
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
Inside Aereo, PROTECTMYANTENNA, http://protectmyantenna.org (last visited Mar. 29,
2016).
79
Id.
80
American Broad. Cos. Inc., 874 F. Supp. 2d at 375.
81
Jordan Clark, Aereo Files for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, TECH CRUNCH (Mar. 29, 2014),
http://techcrunch.com/2014/11/21/aereo-files-for-chapter-11-bankruptcy/.
82
Bill Rosenblatt, TiVo Moves Towards Legal Aereo Offering, FORBES (Mar. 29, 2015),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/billrosenblatt/2015/05/20/tivo-inches-towards-legalaereo/#2715e4857a0b76eeb5cf52d1.
74
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in a single warehouse in Brooklyn.83 Each dime-sized antenna was
dedicated to only one customer; meaning, no two customers could
capture the broadcast television signals from the same antenna.84
Aereo’s antennas also remained idle when a customer was not watching or recording a show.85 The antenna tuned into a frequency, in
which no broadcast signals were available when the cable service was
not in use.86 Each antenna stood idle in this unreachable frequency,
and only immediately became active when a user either elected to
watch a show or recorded the show for later viewing.87
Once the antenna became active by the sole customer assigned to that antenna, it then tuned back into the frequency that captured the active over-the-air broadcast signal.88 The antenna immediately began recording the broadcast and saved it to the cloud storage
where it played for the customer to view on any Internet-capable device.89 Aereo’s customers had two functions available to them:
“watch” a show or “record” a show.90 When a customer elected the
“watch” function, the antenna captured the signal, made a copy of
that signal, and saved that copy to the cloud.91 Only after the signal
was saved to the cloud was the viewer able to “watch.” In this case, a
viewer was able to watch the television program in almost real-time
with only a few seconds delay.92 In comparison, when the customer
elected to “record” the show, the antenna performed the same set of
functions as it did for the “watch” feature with the copy stored in the
cloud to be accessed by the user to be viewed later, as opposed to live
playback.93
C.

Aereo: Cloud Zero

Beginning in 2010, Aereo offered cloud storage to users who
83

WNET, 712 F.3d at 682.
Id. at 682-83.
85
Brief for Appellee-Respondent at 28, American Broad. Cos. et al. v. Aereo, Inc. 134 S.
Ct. 2498 (2014) (No. 13-461), 2013 U.S. S. Ct. Brief LEXIS 5050 [hereinafter Brief for Appellee-Respondent].
86
Brief for Appellee-Respondent, supra note 85, at 7.
87
Brief for Appellee-Respondent, supra note 85, at 28-29.
88
Brief for Appellee-Respondent, supra note 85, at 28-29.
89
Brief for Appellee-Respondent, supra note 85, at 8-9.
90
Brief for Appellee-Respondent, supra note 85, at 7.
91
Brief for Appellee-Respondent, supra note 85, at 9.
92
Brief for Appellee-Respondent, supra note 85, at 9.
93
Brief for Appellee-Respondent, supra note 85, at 9-10.
84
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wanted to watch live or recorded broadcast television, but did not
want to pay the high cost of cable or satellite television.94 Users were
able to watch live television or previously recorded television shows
from any Internet-capable device from their Aereo account.95 As
aforementioned, no two users had access to the same account; no two
users had access to the same antenna; and as long as each user was
connected to the Internet in the geographic location where Aereo operated, they could watch their favorite shows.96
IV.

THE NETWORK BROADCASTERS VERSUS AEREO
A.

Aereo I

In 2011, Plaintiffs, ABC, NBC, WNET, CBS, among other
television networks (collectively “Networks”) filed a suit in the
Southern District of New York against the online television streaming service, Aereo.97 The suit alleged that Aereo was infringing upon
the public performance right by retransmitting the free over–the-air
broadcast signals to the members of the public as defined by the
transmit clause, and then charging a monthly fee for its use.98 In this
case, the District Court was called upon to address several issues.
Firstly, the court had to determine if Aereo’s individual antennas
worked as one large antenna or if they worked independently.99 Secondly, the court assessed whether Aereo’s system was distinguishable
from the facts and holding in Cablevision to determine if the network’s assertion of infringement was likely to succeed on the merits
of their claim.100 Lastly, the court had to decide whether an injunction was appropriate.101
94

PROTECTMYANTENNA, supra note 78.
Brief for Appellee-Respondent, supra note 85, at 8-9
96
WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676, 680-83 (2d Cir. 2013).
97
American Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 874 F. Supp. 2d 373 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
98
Id. at 375.
99
Id. at 379.
100
Id. at 382.
101
American Broad. Cos., Inc., 874 F. Supp. 2d at 376 (citing Winter v. NRDC, Inc., 555
U.S. 7, 20 (2008); Metro. Taxicab Bd. of Trade v. City of New York, 615 F.3d 152, 156 (2d
Cir. 2010). (“A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy, granted only if the plaintiff establishes ‘that he is likely to succeed on the merits that he is likely to suffer irreparable
harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and
that an injunction is in the public interest.’ Even if a plaintiff has not demonstrated a likeli95
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The Plaintiff Networks asserted that, although Aereo’s system
was comprised of thousands of tiny dime-sized antennas specifically
assigned privately to separate users, the system’s overall structure
was just a modern-day CATV system102 They contended that because the tiny antennas were placed on a shared metallic substructure,
these antennas worked essentially as one large antenna.103 After
hearing expert testimony that debated the significance of the individual antennae, the court then determined that Aereo’s individual antennas worked independently of each other to create separate private
performances and not as one larger antenna, which would create one
large public performance.104
As well, the District Court determined the Networks’ assertion of infringement was not likely to succeed on the merits because
the controlling Second Circuit precedent in Cablevision was significantly applicable to the facts in Aereo.105 The Networks claimed that
Aereo’s system was factually distinguishable from that in Cablevision for several reasons.106 First, the Networks alleged that Aereo
publicly performs because it is the functional equivalent of a CATV
system.107 Instead of accepting that each distinct copy was transmitted from an individual antenna, the Networks argued that the antennas collectively formed one larger antenna that pass along the original transmission to all of Aereo’s customers and was thus illegal.108
The court’s rejection of the claim that Aereo transmitted one
collective broadcasting signal determines that Aereo’s case is stronger here than it was in Cablevision. This is because Aereo’s copies are
made from separate streams of data from each antenna receiving the
original signal as opposed to the single stream of data transmitted by
Cablevision’s RS-DVR.109 In other words, Aereo’s system is not
hood of success on the merits, a preliminary injunction may still be granted if the plaintiff
shows ‘a serious question going to the merits to make them a fair ground for trial, with a balance of hardships tipping decidedly in the plaintiffs favor.’”).
102
American Broad. Cos., Inc., 874 F. Supp. 2d at 385.
103
Id. at 379.
104
Id. at 381.
105
Id. at 392 (citing Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008),
which held that the RS-DVR technology used by the defendants did not create a public performance with respect to the Transmit Clause because each user was viewing his or her own
exclusive private performance of the copyrighted work).
106
Id. at 389.
107
American Broad. Cos., Inc., 874 F. Supp. 2d at 385.
108
Id.
109
Id. at 387.
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continuously relaying one singular transmission to its users from one
large antenna. Instead, each user receives his or her own transmission because each person is receiving just one copy from his or her
own antenna.
Additionally, the Networks’ argument failed because of its reliance on the time-shifting analysis that was used by the Cablevision
court to address the RS-DVR’s potential for infringement.110 The
court harshly criticized the Networks’ reliance on time-shifting primarily because the Cablevision court did not apply the time-shifting
analysis to the public performance issue in that case. Instead, the
time-shifting element was used in the discussion of a different issue
relating to fair use of the copyrighted work.111
Although the Court found that the Networks were likely to
suffer irreparable harm from decreased viewership absent a preliminary injunction, the Plaintiffs’ motion was ultimately denied. The
Court found that doing so would create a burden upon Aereo that
substantially outweighed any burden upon the Networks.112
B.

Aereo II

The Networks appealed the judgment of the Southern District
to the Second Circuit asserting an abuse of discretion by the lower
court in denying their motion for preliminary injunction,113 asserting
several arguments, which attempted to distinguish the Cablevision
decision from Aereo, which ultimately failed.114
The Networks asserted that both the plain language of the
Transmit Clause and the legislative intent behind the 1976 Copyright
Act deemed Aereo’s system analogous to a cable system.115 Thus,
the Networks asserted that Aero publicly performed their copyrighted
works. While the Networks attempted to distinguish Aereo from the
controlling Cablevision case, the court found no merit to all of the
Networks’ arguments.116 The Second Circuit rebuffed the Networks’
assertion by carefully examining Cablevision’s four prevailing
110
111
112
113
114
115
116

Id.
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
American Broad. Cos., Inc., 874 F. Supp. 2d at 405.
WNET v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676 (2d Cir. 2013).
Id. at 695.
Id. at 686.
Id. at 689-95.
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guideposts to analyzing the Transmit Clause while also scrutinizing
how Aereo’s technology functioned in comparison to a cable television system.117 In finding that Cablevision controlled and that the
Network’s assertions gave unpersuasive determinations, the Second
Circuit affirmed.118
After losing two cases, the Networks found one judge who
was persuaded by their argument.119 In his dissent, Judge Chin was
not convinced that Aereo’s technology made Aereo distinctive from
traditional cable systems.120 He criticized Aero’s technology and
deemed it a “Rube Goldberg-like contrivance” in that Aereo simply
built their system to evade copyright liability.121 Judge Chin organized his dissenting opinion into three sections.122 First, Judge Chin
argued that the 1976 Act’s text applied directly to the activities of
Aereo.123 He implied that the separate private performances created
by Aereo via the company’s independent-acting antennae system
should be aggregated because these performances were ultimately
created by one entity.124 He further asserted that even if separate performances were indeed limited to persons within the normal circle of
the family and their acquaintances, ultimately, Aereo transmitted underlying performances to paying subscribers numbered in the thousands.125 Thus, concluding that Aereo’s broadcasting system performed publicly.126
Second, Judge Chin found that Aereo’s activities fell within
the legislative intent behind the amendment of the 1909 Act, which
resulted in the 1976 Act.127 His ruling is based on the idea that since
Aereo charges for the use of the service to relay broadcast television
and cloud storage space, it is essentially a cable system.128 He further
found that the amendment to the 1909 Act was done so with the
emergence of new technologies in mind, asserting not only that the
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128

Id. at 689.
WNET, 712 F.3d at 695.
Id. at 697-705 (Chin, J., dissenting).
Id. at 701.
Id. at 697.
Id. at 696-705.
WNET, 712 F.3d at 698-99.
Id. at 698.
Id. at 699.
Id.
Id.
WNET, 712 F.3d at 700.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol32/iss2/8

16

Rothman: Beyond the Cloud

2016

BEYOND THE CLOUD

291

Act was to cover all known technology, but that technology that
would emerge for years to come.129
Finally, Judge Chin made his own comparison of the decision
and technology in Cablevision to that of Aereo’s technology. He
found that Aereo’s system is entirely distinguishable from the RSDVR in Cablevision for two reasons.130 First, Judge Chin argued that
Cablevision was exclusively reproducing materials that it already
held the right to retransmit.131 In comparison, Aereo was allowing
the copying and retransmission of copyrighted materials with no
permission to do so.132 In Judge Chin’s view, infringement of copyright falls squarely on who has legal ownership over the work, and
since Cablevision was legally allowed to publicly perform the work
in the first instance, it was permissible that they allowed public performances in the second instance.133 However, because Aereo did not
have a right to the broadcasted materials, it follows that Aereo had no
right to then allow its users to watch the materials.134
Judge Chin’s second reason for why Aereo’s system is factually distinct was slightly more contrived. He asserted that Aereo’s
system allowed the company to obtain copyrighted materials in
which it had no license and provided users with two functions to
watch the work, whereas Cablevision only gave their users one unlicensed option to watch the programs.135 He claimed that user interaction was entirely different between Aereo and Cablevision.136 Judge
Chin’s assessment that RS-DVR technology “was not designed to be
a substitute viewing live television broadcasts” is subject to questioning.137 He concluded that the two systems are inherently different because Cablevision’s users had to manually initiate the RS-DVR system to record, while Aereo’s users do not intentionally ask Aereo to
record a copy under the “watch” function; instead, it is the Aereo sys129
Id. at 701 (“While Congress in 1976 might not have envisioned the precise technological innovations employed by Aereo today, this legislative history surely suggests that Congress could not have intended for such a system to fall outside the definition of a public performance.”).
130
Id. at 701-03.
131
Id. at 702.
132
Id.
133
WNET, 712 F.3d at 702.
134
Id.
135
Id. at 702-03.
136
Id. at 702.
137
Id. at 703.
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tem automatically initiating the copy, not the users.138
While Aereo and Cablevision may differ slightly in regards to
a user’s experience of the record functions, Judge Chin’s assessment
that Aereo and Cablevision broadcasting systems are inherently different is entirely incorrect. As aforementioned, Aereo remained
completely idle until a user logged in to order either the live broadcast or a recorded copy of live broadcast.139 The copy that occurred
during the live function was a buffering mechanism that would be
continuously deleted when the user viewed that specific part of the
show.140 In his assessment of why Cablevision is factually distinguishable, he seemingly compared apples to oranges in order to conclude that Aereo and Cablevision are, in fact, apples and oranges,
since he believes Aereo’s technology is just a fancy cable system.
While Judge Chin did focus on the differences in technologies between the two systems, he takes issue with how Aereo presented itself to the public as well as the issue of failing to hold a copyright for
retransmission.141 Further, his finding that because Aereo’s users did
not specifically ask for the system to begin making a copy under the
“watch” function, the interaction was completely different from the
user interaction in Cablevision.142 However, Cablevision’s system
split the “live” and “record” streams without user command, whereas
Aereo’s system required user interaction to pick up or record a live
stream for a performance to occur.143 To Judge Chin, this was nothing more than an unnecessary distinction – essentially a 21st century
mechanism for evading copyright laws.144

138
139
140
141
142
143
144

WNET, 712 F.3d at 701-02.
See Section II(b), supra.
WNET, 712 F.3d at 682.
Id. at 702.
Id.
Id. at 703.
Id. at 697. The author provided:
Aereo's “technology platform” is, however, a sham. The system employs thousands of individual dime-sized antennas, but there is no technologically sound reason to use a multitude of tiny individual antennas
rather than one central antenna; indeed, the system is a Rube Goldberglike contrivance, over-engineered in an attempt to avoid the reach of the
Copyright Act and to take advantage of a perceived loophole in the law.

WNET, 712 F.3d at 697.
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THE SUPREME COURT AND AEREO

In a six-to-three majority opinion written by Justice Breyer,
the Networks’ argument that Aereo publicly performed found success.145 The majority focused more on the intent of the 1976 Copyright Act rather than setting a standard to interpret the ambiguous
language of the Transmit Clause with respect to new technology.146
The Court provides no discussion for why it found that the technological differences between a cable system and Aereo were insignificant.
Instead, the majority takes a two-step approach in determining that
Aereo publicly performed.147 First, the Court inquired whether Aereo
“performed” and if so, whether the performance was public?148 The
basis for the majority’s opinion however, falls on a technologically –
neutral approach to applying Aereo to the Transmit Clause.149
In writing for the majority, Justice Breyer spends little time
incorporating the factual differences between Aereo’s system and a
cable system. While the majority decision briefly discusses how
Aereo works, nevertheless, these facts are left almost entirely out of
the legal analysis of the discussion. Instead, at the onset, the majority
felt that Aereo was the modern day equivalent of a cable system and
then preceded to use the historical context behind the 1976 Act to
support this contention.150
The Court took a two-step approach to determine if Aereo infringed on the public performance right. First, the Court asked
whether Aereo “performed” and then whether Aereo performed “publicly.”151 The Court’s analysis followed a functionalist approach that
looked not to the technological differences of Aereo’s system with
that of a cable system, but rather that Aereo’s system in general functions like a cable system. In rejecting the Second Circuit’s contentions that the Transmit Clause directs analysis to who is “capable of
receiving” the transmission and any factor “limiting the potential audience” to a particular transmission, the Court found that it is the relationship between members of the public to the underlying work that
145

Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2500-02.
Id.
147
Id. at 2504-05.
148
Id.
149
Samuel J. Dykstra, Weighing Down the Cloud: The Public Performance Right and the
Internet After Aereo, 46 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 989, 1023-26, 1028-29, 1034, 1049 (2015).
150
Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2504.
151
Id.
146
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will create a public performance.152 In this sense, because the underlying performance (i.e., the original transmission) was made “to the
public,” any retransmission would then be considered a “public performance” of the work.
While the Court did note at least one technological difference
between Aereo and cable systems, it found this difference irrelevant.153 Instead, the Court rendered Aereo’s discrete transmissions as
indistinguishable from the retransmissions created from a CATV system and through implication, aggregated the private retransmissions
made to the members of the public that the original transmission was
made publicly available to determine that Aereo did in fact perform
publicly.154 The aggregation of the private performances led the
Court to the conclusion that it is because Aereo allows members of
the public to watch free over-the-air television; it is the functional
equivalent to a cable system.155
The Court’s interpretation frustrates the long accepted understanding of whether a particular transmission is capable of reaching
those outside of a normal family circle, which has been accepted primarily by the Second Circuit as well as other district courts throughout the country. The Court’s functional approach offered little guidance on how an entity performs publicly and instead leaves the lower
courts with wide discretion in deciding whether the public performance right has been infringed in regard to new technologies.156 This
analysis deviates considerably from the complex analysis that the Second Circuit employed. While the Second Circuit looked closely to
the facts of each case and differences in technologies, it paid closer
attention to the language of the Transmit Clause, which in turn would
then be carefully applied to the case at bar.157 The Supreme Court in
Aereo gave no technical analysis but instead offered the historical
background of the development of the Transmit Clause as a pretext to
the resulting analysis.158 The Court essentially left new and emerging
technologies at the mercy of cable companies and outdated case

152
153
154
155
156
157
158

Id. at 2507-08.
Id. at 2507.
Id. at 2508.
Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2509-10.
Id. at 2517.
WNET, 712 F.3d at 686-94.
Aereo, 134 S. Ct at 2504.
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law.159 Therefore, the Court found that because Aereo’s activities
were substantially similar to those of cable television companies,
Congress intended to include a system like Aereo’s under the 1976
Copyright Act.160 However, as a preemptive measure, the Court established that its holding should only be strictly limited to systems
functioning like Aereo’s as to not frustrate current and emerging
technologies.161
In writing for the dissent, Justice Scalia, joined by Justices
Alito and Thomas, pointed out many of the inherent flaws that are associated with the majority’s analogical reasoning.162 In particular,
Justice Scalia acknowledged that Aereo’s technology is designed so
that it is the user who controls Aereo’s functionality.163 The dissent
begins with the discussion of the volitional conduct test that is associated with many copyright infringement cases that involve new
technologies.164 This test, which was fully recognized by the Supreme Court in Sony, looks at how the system is controlled.165 This
volitional conduct rule was adopted by the Second Circuit in Cablevision as a deciding factor in finding that the RS-DVR was not an infringement.166 On the one hand, if the system is entirely or mostly
controlled by user conduct, the system is not directly liable for copyright infringement, but is secondarily liable.167 If the system leaves
little control to the user, then it is directly liable for copyright infringement.168 The dissent heavily criticizes the way the majority
overlooks the technological differences, instead opting to simply
compare Aereo to a cable company.169 Although in his discussion,
Scalia acknowledged that Aereo may nevertheless be skirting the
159

Id. at 2511.
Id.
161
Id. at 2510. (“We agree that Congress, while intending the Transmit Clause to apply
broadly to cable companies and their equivalents, did not intend to discourage or to control
the emergence or use of different kinds of technologies. But we do not believe that our limited holding today will have that effect.”).
162
Id. at 2511-18 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
163
Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2512 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 433).
164
Id.
165
Id.
166
Cartoon Network LP, 536 F.3d at 131-32.
167
Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2512 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
168
Columbia Pictures Indus., 749 F.2d at 156-62; On Command Video Corp., 777 F.
Supp. at 788-90; Cartoon Network LP, 536 F.3d at 130-40; Fox Television Stations, Inc., 915
F. Supp. 2d at 1143-46; Fox Television Stations, Inc., F. Supp. 2d at 37-42, 45-49.
169
Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2515-517.
160
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Copyright Act, he rejected the way in which the majority finds for infringement.170 The dissent points to the inherent confusion the majority will cast upon new forms of technology with respect to the public
performance right because the Court failed to account for the very
different functions of each system.171
VI.

WHERE THE SUPREME COURT WENT WRONG ON THE
TRANSMIT CLAUSE

The majority in Aereo declined to assess the Transmit Clause
in a way that could be applied to Aereo’s system.172 In opting for a
simple and neutral approach to how the Clause should read with respect to new innovations, the decision leaves long-standing legal
principles and new technologies waiting in the wind. This part will
examine three ways in which the Court’s decision broadened the
scope of the Transmit Clause.
A.

Neutrality Over Complexity

The Supreme Court’s analysis demonstrates its misunderstanding of why differences in technological functions are key to interpreting the Transmit Clause. Instead of rendering an opinion on
how to interpret the language of the Transmit Clause with which the
lower courts grappled with, the Court chose a route that can further
confuse and invite a flood of litigation.173 The crux of the Court’s
discussion falls primarily on the contention that Aereo is the functional equivalent of a cable system. While, on its face, Aereo might
resemble a cable system, its differences in technology are important
factors as to why Aereo should not be equated with a cable system.
In relying solely on Congressional intent of the Transmit Clause, the
Court overlooked over 35 years of technical innovation and case law
and essentially tipped the Constitutional scale in favor of copyright
holders and leaving the progression of the arts and sciences hanging
by a thread.
The Transmit Clause was included in the 1976 Copyright Act
170

Id. at 2514-15 (Scalia, J., dissenting); 17 U.S.C.A. § 111 (West 2014).
Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2512 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
172
Id. at 2509 (explaining that, “[w]e do not see how the fact that Aereo transmits via personal copies of the programs could make a difference”).
173
Id. at 2512 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
171
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as a way to encompass new technology emerging in broadcast television.174 The majority took the approach that if an entity like Aereo
looked like a cable company then it is a cable company, which then
falls under what the 1976 Act sought to cover.175 Cable television
companies are granted a compulsory license through Section 111 of
the Copyright Act.176 This license enables cable companies to retransmit the copyrighted works in exchange for a fee instead of paying each network directly for a license to publicly perform each copyrighted work.177 The Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
reserves the right to regulate the cable industry and in turn, once a
company is deemed a “cable company,” it is granted a compulsory
license through Section 111.178 However, as of today, Internet television providers are not considered “cable companies” under either the
Copyright Act or the Federal Communications Act.179
Aereo and the Networks’ claim that Aereo is not a cable system is not due to compromise. This contention is supported by the
FCC, which has determined that cable systems do not include any
“facility that serves only to retransmit television signals of one or
more television broadcast stations.”180 While this does not support
Aereo’s contention that its system does not publicly perform the
Network’s copyrighted works, the FCC makes clear that any system
similar to Aereo’s is not a cable system. Under FCC guidelines, employing a neutral approach to differences in technology seems misplaced. It then makes no sense as to why the Court would essentially
deem Aereo a “cable company” if the FCC has outright denied that
any equivalent to Aereo is not a cable system. The determination that
Aereo is essentially a cable system in terms of the public performance right and Transmit Clause under the 1976 Copyright seems
then to run counterintuitive to not only both Aereo’s and the Networks’ arguments, but a widely accepted understanding of cable systems set forth by a government run agency.
174

H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 47 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 1976 WL
14045.
175
Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2506-07.
176
17 U.S.C.A. § 111 (West 2014).
177
Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2506.
178
Id.
179
MARYBETH PETERS, SATELLITE HOME VIEWER EXTENSION AND REAUTHORIZATION ACT
SECTION 109 REPORT, at 181 (June 2008).
180
Cable Television, FCC, https://www.fcc.gov/media/engineering/cable-television (last
visited Mar. 29, 2016).
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The Bigger and Badder Transmit Clause: Leaving
Private Performances in the Cloudy Dust

Part II of the Court’s majority opinion addresses the issue of
whether Aereo “performs” as defined by the 1976 Copyright Act and
then if Aereo performs, whether it does so “publicly.”181 The Court
delved into a lengthy discussion of the history of cable systems and
the public performance right in Part II of the opinion.182 However,
after determining that Aereo “performs,” the Court’s analysis becomes problematic. It is here that the Court deemed Aereo’s system
analogous to the cable systems in Fortnightly and Teleprompter but
provided no technological analysis as to how it came to this conclusion.183 The Court stated that the only difference between the systems is the consistent receiving and retransmitting by cable companies and the user controlled receiving and retransmitting by Aereo.184
Instead, the Court saw no reason why this difference should be given
any analytical weight because regardless, Aereo’s basic function is
equivalent to a cable system.185 Further, the Court ignored that cable
systems ran on one large antenna connected through users via a series
of coaxial cables, whereas Aereo’s systems run on hundreds of user
specific antennae.186 In cable systems, all of the subscribers tune into
the same transmission coming from one antenna and share that singular stream. In terms of Aereo, each user is assigned his or her own
antenna, which transmits its own copy to the cloud for that particular
user to receive.187 Without even laying a foundational argument as to
why Aereo is similar to a cable system, the Court simply made the
determinative assertion that Aereo is a functional equivalent, which
leads the Court’s conclusion to follow that Aereo performs because
cable systems perform.188
Justice Scalia asserted in his dissent that because the Court
deemed Aereo’s system the functional equivalent of a cable system,
the rest of the majority opinion’s discussion is simply superfluous.189
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189

Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2504.
Id. at 2504-06.
Id. at 2506.
Id. at 2507.
Id.
Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2508-09.
Id. at 2508.
Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2507.
Id. at 2515.
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Under the 1976 Copyright Act, cable systems not only perform but
they perform publicly.190 Since the majority renders Aereo an equivalent to a cable system, any discussion as to “public performance”
seems unnecessary. Even though the Court continued with a “public
performance” analysis, the Court’s predetermination set up in Part II
renders any conclusion on the issue unnecessary.
Regardless, Part III of the Court’s analysis attempts to address
“whether Aereo performs petitioners’ works publicly.”191 While it is
here that the Court touches upon the fact that Aereo’s system creates
discrete transmissions through multiple antennas dedicated to only
one user, it still renders these differences indistinguishable from cable
systems in terms of Congressional intent behind the 1976 Copyright
Act.192 The Court furthered this conclusion by applying the plain
language of the Transmit Clause.193 It is here that the Court began to
forgo the Copyright Act’s non-applicability to private performances
and implied that the language of the Transmit Clause calls for an aggregation of discrete performances regardless of whether they occur
in the home to one person or to a place where a large gathering of the
public occurs.194
The Court honed in on the specific language in the Transmit
Clause – “whether the members of the public capable of receiving the
performance or display receiving it in the same place or in separate
places and at the same time or at different times” – to determine that
when an entity transmits even separate and distinct transmissions, it
is publicly performing.195 To further this point, several examples
were employed to support this conclusion.196 What the Court does,
however, is aggregate private performances to determine that a public
190
191
192
193
194
195
196

17 U.S.C.A. §§ 101, 111 (West 2014).
Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2507-08.
Id. at 2508.
Id. at 2509.
Id. at 2509.
17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West 2014).
Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2509. The Court stated:
But the Clause suggests that an entity may transmit a performance
through multiple discrete transmissions. That is because one can ‘transmit’ or ‘communicate’ something through a set of actions. Similarly,
one’s colleagues may watch a performance of a particular performance.
Whether they do so at separate or at the same showings. By the same
principle, an entity may transmit a performance through one or several
transmissions, where the performance is of the same work.

Id.
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performance has occurred.197 It then implicitly confuses the types of
systems the courts dealt with in Redd Horne and On Demand Video
Corp and asserted Aereo’s system employed the same functions.198
This flawed assumption misinterprets both the public performance right and the Transmit Clause entirely. Perhaps the Court underestimated just how ambiguous the definitional language of public
performance in § 101 really is. As mentioned previously, § 101 sets
out two distinctions of when a copyrighted work is performed publicly; one being the threshold of when private becomes public, and the
other being the Transmit Clause.199 The Copyright Act makes clear
that if a work is performed or displayed in the privacy of one’s home
in front of a normal family circle and its acquaintances, then the work
is performed privately.200 When a work is performed or displayed
privately, it is not an infringement on a copyright holder’s exclusive
rights because the copyright holder only has the right to display or
perform his or her works publicly or authorize such rights.201 Therefore, under the plain meaning of the statute, Aereo’s users are performing privately when they deliberately enable Aereo’s userspecific individual antennas to capture the broadcast signal and play
that signal in their own home.
Regardless of this reasoning, Aereo and its users’ actions fall
under the Transmit Clause which renders transmissions or communications “public performances” if they are done so to the public, a
specified in subsection (1) by “any device or process” regardless if
the members of the public are together or in separate places.202 The
Transmit Clause employs peculiar language in that a public performance of a work is transmitted or communicated to the public if the
public is situated together or separately and receive it all at the same
time or at different times. If this language were taken literally, it almost seems as if this language renders even private performances as
public ones.203
Many prominent intellectual property law commentators have
197

Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2509-510.
Redd Horne, 749 F.2d at 154; On Command Video Corp., 777 F. Supp. at 787.
199
Fortnightly, 392 U.S. at 390; Teleprompter, 94 S. Ct. at 1129; 17 U.S.C.A. § 101
(2010).
200
MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT 386 (2014) [hereinafter NIMMER].
201
17 U.S.C.A. § 106 (2002).
202
RUDD, supra note 7, at 4.
203
NIMMER, supra note 200, at 1.
198
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discussed how the courts should look at the Transmit Clause and the
public performance right.204 Professor M. Nimmer has long advocated for the non-aggregation of private performances,205 whereas Professor Paul Goldstein has supported a “pro-aggregation” approach.206
This split in analyses has accurately reflected the complexity of both
the Transmit Clause and the public performance right with respect to
emerging technologies. The broad language of the Transmit Clause
has led to confusion and uncertainty as to how the Clause should be
applied and analyzed.207
One theory, Professor Nimmer’s “Non-Aggregation Theory,”
postulates that the language of the Transmit Clause was intended to
reflect an instance when the same copy or transmission of a work is
played repeatedly to different members of the public although played
at different times, resulting in a public performance of that copy.208
This theory would seem to make better sense of the ambiguous language, and many courts have followed this reasoning.209 This was
the basis for Cablevision’s holding.210 In accordance with Nimmer,
the Second Circuit argued that the unique copies of the underlying
performance have the capability of reaching only one user and no one
else.211 The production of individual copies substantially limits the
exposure to anyone outside the normal family circle and its acquaintances, satisfying a private performance.212
A cable system works differently from Aereo’s system. A
cable system not only retransmits free over-the-air signals to its customers but supplies their own unique programming as well. Since the
decisions in Fortnightly and Teleprompter, the cable industry has
grown tremendously, while still retaining many of the same basic
204

PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT (3d ed. 2009).
NIMMER, supra note 200, at 42.
206
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 204, at 167.
207
NIMMER, supra note 200, at 29.
208
NIMMER, supra note 200, at 29.
209
Cartoon Network LP, 536 F.3d at 121 (finding that “the transmit clause directs us to
examine who precisely is ‘capable of receiving’ a particular transmission of a performance.”); Columbia Pictures Indus., 749 F.2d at 154 (holding that the defendant’s activities
in exhibiting videocassettes of plaintiff’s films for a fee in private booths constituted public
performances); On Command Video Corp., 777 F. Supp. 787 (finding that, “whether these
guests view the transmission simultaneously or sequentially, the transmission is still a public
performance since it goes to members of the public.”).
210
Cartoon Network LP, 536 F.3d at 138.
211
Id. (“[A] cable company performs when it retransmits a copyrighted work.”).
212
Id.
205
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functions. Cable television systems place various regional facilities
which house signal reception equipment around their designated region of operation and each customer is plugged into these facilities
through a complex system of coaxial cables.213 When these facilities
receive the broadcast signals, they retransmit a new singular stream
of the data to their customers who then receive this singular stream.214
The receiving equipment in these regional facilities receives the
broadcast signals on a constant basis and then the retransmissions run
constantly as well.215 In accordance with both Nimmer and the Second Circuit’s analysis, the retransmissions are capable of being received by members of the public outside the normal family circle.216
Thus, the lack of individualized singular transmissions capable of only being received by each individual user is why a cable system performs publicly.217 Nimmer calls for the aggregation of the private
performances from the singular stream of data and not private performances from individualized retransmissions.218
Aereo and its Amici fully supported Nimmer’s “nonaggregation” theory and advocated that Aereo does not perform publicly.219 In its brief, Dish Network defends Nimmer’s theory by emphasizing that the Transmit clause is applicable to “multicasting,” a
process by which a singular transmission reaches many members of
the public.220 However, Aereo’s system creates “unicasting,” which
is a one-to-one transmission, only capable of reaching one person, or
213

The State of the Art and Evolution of Cable Television and Broadband Technology,
9, 2013), http://www.ctcnet.us.html.
214
Krista Consiglio, Aereo and FilmOn: Technology’s Latest Copyright War and Why
Aereo Should Survive, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2557 (2014).
215
Id.
216
NIMMER, supra note 200, at 386; Cartoon Network LP, 536 F.3d at 121.
217
Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2509-11.
218
NIMMER, supra note 200, at 29.
219
Brief for 36 Intellectual Property and Copyright Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, American Broad. Cos., Inc., v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014) (No.
13-461), 2014 WL 1348474; Brief for Intellectual Property & Copyright Law Professors as
Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, American Broad. Cos., Inc., v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct.
2498 (2014) (No. 13-461), 2012 WL 5387386; Brief for The Electronic Frontier Foundation
et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, American Broad. Cos., v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S.
Ct. 2498 (2014) (No. 13-461), 2014 WL 1364988; Brief for Filmon X, LLC et al. as Amici
Curiae Supporting Affirmance, American Broad. Cos., Inc., v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498
(2014) (No. 13-461), 2014 WL 1348476.
220
Brief for Dish Network, L.L.C. & Echostar Technologies, L.L.C. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondent, American Broad. Cos., Inc., v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014)
(No. 13-461), 2014 WL 1348475.
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a group involving a close family circle.221 The Transmit Clause does
not cover this type of transmission, the brief notes, as this constitutes
a private performance.222 The amici brief for FilmOn X further asserts that the argument set forth by the Networks would render the
scope of the Transmit Clause overly broad.223 As discussed further
below, the Networks believe that the Transmit Clause focuses on the
potential audience of the underlying work and not the audience of the
individual transmission. In its brief, FilmOn X finds this argument is
too broad an interpretation of the Clause, as it would eviscerate an
individual’s ability to perform a work privately.224 Under the view of
the Networks, an individual private performance would then be a
public one as an underlying work is inherently capable of being received by anyone with equipment enabling him or her to view the
copyrighted work, whether that equipment is through a cable company or a roof-top antenna.225
Since the Supreme Court in Aereo first deemed Aereo’s system a functional equivalent to a cable system, it incorrectly assumes
that Aereo was transmitting the same performance of the underlying
work to all of its users simultaneously from one antenna.226 If
Aereo’s system had been transmitting the same performance of the
underlying work to all of its users, then Nimmer’s theory would apply, and thus, it would be appropriate to aggregate the individual
showings of the same performance of the underlying work.227 However, Aereo’s system creates private performances because each antenna captures a signal for one specific user. This incorrect identification leads the Court to apply this aggregate theory to all private
performances of the underlying work to find a public performance.
This interpretation is more akin to the analysis asserted by
Professor Goldstein in his treatise, which rejects Nimmer’s NonAggregation Theory.228 Goldstein argues that the Second Circuit’s
221

Id.
Id. at 20-27.
223
Brief for Filmon X, LLC et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Affirmance, American
Broad. Cos., Inc., v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014) (No. 13-461), 2014 WL 1348476.
224
Id.
225
Brief of 36 Intellectual Property and Copyright Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondent, American Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014) (No. 13-461),
2014 WL 1348474.
226
Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2507.
227
NIMMER, supra note 200, at 1.
228
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 204, at 167.
222
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interpretation of the Transmit Clause “entirely undermined” the intent
of the “same place-separate place . . . same time-different time . . .”
language.229 He reasons that the Second Circuit treated “transmissions” and “performances” as one in the same when he says “the Act
clearly treats them as distinct . . . operative terms.”230 Goldstein further argues that because the Court could not separate the two words,
the Court essentially renders every distinct transmission as a private
performance.231 While Goldstein may perhaps be correct in determining that the Court decided to treat “transmission” and “performance” as one entity, his conclusion fails to incorporate the first part
of the clause that determines when and where the transmission of a
performance or display must occur to render it “public.”232 If read in
its entirety, the transmission of the performance only becomes “public” if it is done so outside of one’s home or to a small family gathering inclusive of the family’s social acquaintances.233 Taken in that
context, the Second Circuit still determined that each individual
transmission of the performance was not sent to the public because
they were sent to each individual user’s home.234 This placed a limitation on who was capable of receiving the given transmission.235
This limitation was important in determining whether the transmission was a public performance. It would be absurd to assume that
Congress intended to reflect individualized transmissions of the performance to individual homes to fall within the “same place or in different places and at the same time or at different times” language of
the statute simply because those individuals are situated in “separate
places” and perhaps viewing their own individual transmissions “at
the same time or different times.”236 Under this reading, everyone
watching that particular transmission of the performance would be
publicly performing. To further drive the point that the Second Circuit did not confuse the two terms, Congress was clear in the 1976
House Report that “any act by which the initial performance . . . is
229

GOLDSTEIN, supra note 204, at 168.
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 204, at 168.
231
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 204, at 168.
232
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 204, at 168. (The author also correctly asserts that nowhere in
§ 101 is the term “public” defined; it is implicitly defined in that section under subsection (1)
of the Act’s definition of “[T]o perform or display a work ‘publicly’.”).
233
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 204, at 167.
234
Cartoon Network LP, 536 F.3d at 138.
235
Id.
236
17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (2010).
230
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transmitted, repeated, or made to recur would itself be a ‘performance’ . . . under the bill.”237 This clear intention by Congress to
consider a “transmission” synonymous with “performance” renders
Goldstein’s interpretation of the Act invalid.238
While the Networks had ample support advocating for Goldstein’s theory and the fact that the Transmit Clause was meant to
have a broad interpretation,239 the Supreme Court nevertheless followed Goldstein’s interpretation due to a misinterpretation of Nimmer’s theory.240 While the Court’s reasoning simply confirms that
when the same work is given multiple showings, whether to people
individually or together, it is a public performance of that work, what
the Court assumes here is that Aereo is showing the same performance to all of its users even though they are all receiving individual
performances of the underlying work individually. In other words, a
public performance of a work occurs when the same performance of
the underlying work is shown repeatedly to members of the public,
whether they are alone at home or gathered at a public place and
watching that same performance of the underlying work at different
times. This is distinguished from individuals watching their own individual performance of the underlying work; this falls under the private performance exception implied in clause (1) of the definition for
public performance. The Court here confused the same performance
of a work with the original underlying work. This confirms why understanding Aereo’s technology is key to determining why Aereo
does not in fact perform publicly.
As mentioned above, Aereo’s users are assigned an individual
antenna, which is located among thousands of other antennas.241
Each antenna is at the mercy of the user, picking up signals when it is
told, staying idle in all other instances, and then transmitting those

237

H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 63 (1976).
Id.; GOLDSTEIN, supra note 204, at 167.
239
Brief for the Petitioners, American Broad. Cos., Inc., v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498
(2014) (No. 13-461), 1976 WL 14045; Brief for Time Warner, Inc. & Warner Bros. Entertainment, Inc. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, American Broad. Cos., Inc., v. Aereo,
Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014) (No. 13-461), 2013 WL 6040359; Brief for American Intellectual Property Law Association as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, American Broad.
Cos., v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014) (No. 13-461), 2014 WL 828067; Brief for the
United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, American Broad. Cos., v. Aereo,
Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014) (No. 13-461), 2014 WL 828079.
240
WNET, 712 F.3d at 698 (Chin, J., dissenting); Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2509.
241
Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2509.
238
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signals to its owner and no one else.242 Aereo was designed to store a
rooftop antenna equivalent in a remote location which would work
exactly the way a rooftop antenna would work, by picking up signals
when the user turns on the system.243 Here, a rooftop antenna is picking up the original broadcast signal and would then send that transmission to the television.244 However, it is clear that the Court sees
that because Aereo houses these antennas and not the user, it then becomes a cable system, even though at no time is the same performance of the underlying work being transmitted to multiple users at
the same time or at different times.245
After implicitly adopting the argument that all individual private performances should be aggregated to determine that Aereo performed publicly, the Court looked to the relationship between the
public and the underlying work.246 This argument is explained
through an example of a parking valet and a parking garage.247 The
Court postulates that if an entity transmits a performance to users
who own or possess the underlying work then this is not a public performance.248 This reasoning has no basis in either the Act or the
House Report as neither contains any language imposing a requirement that every member of the public must have a relationship to the
underlying work.249 The Court asserts that a private performance occurs when entities transmit performances of copyrighted works to the
242

Id.
PROTECTMYANTENNA, supra note 78, at 1.
244
Antennas
and
Digital
Television,
FCC,
https://www.fcc.gov/consumers/guides/antennas-and-digital-television (last visited Mar. 29,
2016).
245
Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2506-507.
246
Id. at 2510.
247
Id. The Court explained:
This is relevant because when an entity performs to a set of people,
whether they constitute “the public” often depends upon their relationship to the underlying work. When for example, a parking valet attendant returns cars to their drivers, we would not say that the parking
service provides cars ‘to the public.’ We would say that it provides the
cars to their owners. We would say that a car dealership, on the other
hand, does provide cars to the public, for it sells cars to individuals who
lack a pre-existing relationship to the cars.
243

Id.

248

Id. (“Similarly, an entity that transmits a performance to individuals in their capacities
as owners or possessors does not perform ‘to the public,’ whereas an entity like Aereo that
transmits to large numbers of paying subscribers who lack any prior relationship to the
works does so perform.”).
249
17 U.S.C.A. §§ 101, 106 (2010).

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol32/iss2/8

32

Rothman: Beyond the Cloud

2016

BEYOND THE CLOUD

307

owners themselves.250 If the Act were to impose such a requirement,
it would have found no need to provide for a private performance exception, because then everyone would either be holders of the exclusive rights, or would have to pay the holder of the rights to view the
materials. The 1976 amendments made perfectly clear that it would
be against public policy to require every member of the public to pay
a copyright holder for the private use and enjoyment of the work.251
It would then follow that the only members of the public who have
any prior relationship to the copyrighted works are the copyright
holders themselves and any member of the public viewing such work
would be infringing upon that right even if it was done so privately.
C.

I Infringed, but You Were Blamed: Diminishing
the Volitional Conduct Rule

In copyright infringement cases concerning Internet based
services or equipment providers, it has long been accepted by the
Courts that direct liability is sometimes not an appropriate avenue in
determining if conduct was infringing.252 The Supreme Court set this
precedent in the 1980s when videocassette tapes were introduced into
the market.253 In these cases, secondary liability is a more appropriate avenue since the defendant does not directly cause the infringing
conduct but rather “intentionally induces or encourages infringing
acts by others for profits from such acts while declining to exercise a
right to stop or limit them.”254 It is in this instance, the volitional
conduct rule comes into play. When a defendant is found directly liable it is because she committed the infringement by her own will,
however when she induces or encourages such an act that causes
someone else to commit the infringing activity she is then only secondarily liable.255
The dissent recognized that this case should have focused on

250

Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2510.
17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (2010).
252
Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 433; Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.,
545 U.S. 913, 930 (2005).
253
Sony Corp., 464 U.S. 417.
254
Aereo, 134 S. Ct. 2489 at 2512 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Grokster Ltd., 545 U.S.
at 930).
255
Id.
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conduct rather than similarity of function.256 Infringement cases concerning service providers or equipment manufacturers are typically
determined by classifying liabilities with respect to users and the providers.257 While volitional conduct is not usually at issue in directinfringement cases, it becomes a point of contention when the factual
nature of the dispute deems it necessary.258 Justice Scalia points out
that conduct is crucial in examining a liability claim and employing a
proper analysis on it.259
Noticeably absent from Aereo’s majority opinion is any qualitative discussion on volitional conduct. The dissent finds that the volitional conduct requirement is entirely necessary to determining if
Aereo’s system directly infringes or it if it is the users that commit
the infringement.260 The Supreme Court in Sony established that liability in infringement suits involving service providers and equipment
manufacturers should be determined by identifying who was in
charge of the infringing act.261 Although in Aereo, the charge was direct infringement, Justice Scalia nevertheless found that Aereo’s system gives a substantial amount of the control of the system to Aereo’s
users.262 Justice Scalia then likens Aereo’s system to a copy shop.263
He emphasizes that a copy shop is never directly liable for its customers’ infringing activities because it is the customers who control
the equipment and not the shop or the employees themselves.264 This
analysis more accurately reflects Aereo’s function, yet the majority
finds that this comparison is wholly inadequate.265
The Second Circuit in Cablevision applied the volitional conduct rule to further support that the RS-DVR technology did not infringe.266 The RS-DVR would only produce a copy on command of
the user; otherwise, the data would stay in the buffer system. The
Second Circuit then applied this analysis when determining whether
Aereo infringed. It found that since Aereo’s antennas were solely at
256
257
258
259
260
261
262
263
264
265
266

Id.
Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 417; Cartoon Network LP, 536 F.3d at 133.
Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2512 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2512-514.
Id.
Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 435.
Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2514.
Id. at 2513.
Id.
Id. at 2507.
Cartoon Network LP, 536 F.3d at 132-33.
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the mercy of Aereo’s users, Aereo was not directly liable.267 In arguing for releasing Aereo from direct liability, the amici curiae brief for
FilmOn X acknowledges that the Court recognized that equipment
suppliers and manufacturers are not involved in any activities that are
infringing.268
The absence of any discussion of secondary liability and the
volitional conduct rule is troublesome. While Aereo’s system is not
quite an equipment supplier, Aereo was by no means acting on the
behalf of any users when initiating user-specific antennas. Instead,
Aereo’s users had full control on the operation of the antennae and
the signals for which the antennae were to receive.
VII.

STORM CLOUDS AHEAD: WHAT AEREO MEANS FOR CLOUDBASED SERVICES

The Court failed to appreciate why a ruling against Aereo
could have a larger impact on current cloud-computing technology.269
In fact, the decision merely discussed the function as a formality to
inform the reader of the facts at issue.270 The majority found Aereo’s
system similar to a cable system because the user has no physical
control over Aereo’s equipment or servers.271 The Court’s decision
to leave Aereo’s cloud technology out of its analysis, and thus, rendering Aereo essentially a cable system is detrimental to cloud based
technologies for two reasons. The absence of analysis into Aereo’s
cloud service could have been an implication that the Court did not
fully understand the functionality of a cloud-based service. A cloudbased service is essentially a storage space for data.272 When a company offers “cloud storage” it is essentially offering storage space on
its own servers dedicated for solely that use. The cloud can be accessed through the Internet and can be opened on any Internet capable device. No individual has physical access of the cloud or the service. Take for example, the popularly used Google Drive. Anyone
267

WNET, 712 F.3d at 694.
Brief of FilmOn X, LLC, FilmOn.TV, Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, American Broad. Cos., Inc., et al., v. Aereo, Inc., at 13-14, 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014) (No.
13-461).
269
Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2517.
270
Id. at 2503.
271
Id. at 2506.
272
What is cloud computing?, IBM (Dec. 12, 2014, 2:24PM), http://www.ibm.com/cloudcomputing/us/en/what-is-cloud-computing.html.
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with a Google account can effectively upload the entire contents of
their computers to Google Drive’s “Cloud” as an additional way to
keep their files safe in the event their personal computer breaks down
in some way, rendering those files irretrievable from that device.273
That same person can access those files that were saved in the cloud
from another device simply by logging in, where the files are safe
from harm. The Court’s failure to find this feature distinctive leaves
an important question unanswered. Do cloud based services perform
publicly when members of the public access their personal files in
various different places? Suppose several users of Apple’s iCloud
have the movie “My Fair Lady” saved to their individual cloud files.
Now assume those users decide to watch “My Fair Lady” on or about
the same time. Under the Court’s ruling, this could potentially cause
Apple to be publicly performing that movie even though individual
users are watching distinctive copies of that movie.274
The most important take-away from the adoption of Goldstein’s aggregation theory and the Court’s decision is that now, the
Transmit clause directs us to look at who is capable of receiving the
underlying performance. In addition, this reasoning leads us to aggregate private performances created by one entity regardless of
whether the user intentionally caused the performance. The reasoning disregards whether the person obtained the work legally because
once that user has uploaded the work onto the cloud-based hard drive,
any subsequent streaming of that performance renders it a public one
because it is the cloud service that retains and performs the streaming
of the work. To reiterate the example above, if two users lawfully
obtain “My Fair Lady” and wish to watch their individual copy at the
same time, it is now the cloud service who is publicly performing that
work which they had not obtained a license for because the user’s
conduct under Aereo has now been disregarded, and the private performances should be aggregated because they came from the same
entity.
The Court made clear that Aereo is not an equipment provider
because users do not have physical access to every part of its technology, including the servers that hold copies of the transmissions
273

Using Drive, GOOGLE (Feb. 16, 2016), https://accounts.google.com/signup. (The first
15 gigabytes of storage are free when signing up for a Google Drive account, any increase in
storage space is available for an additional fee).
274
Cablevision Systems Corp., Aereo and the Public Performance Right, CABLEVISION
(Dec. 2013), http://www.cablevision.com/pdf/cablevision_aereo_white_paper.pdf.
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and/or relay transmission to the user.275 The Court however, does attempt to answer this quandary by providing that the holding would
pertain to technology only resembling that of cable companies.276
The most troubling part of the majority’s analysis is the acknowledgement that Aereo’s system only begins to run when the user purposely communicates with Aereo’s system that he or she wishes to
watch or record a show.277 However, this function is found to have
no significant impact on whether Aereo performs.278 This astounding
acknowledgement and disregard for this crucial feature essentially
obliterates the precedent set forth by Sony.279 Yet, it is because the
Court failed to employ an analysis based on Aereo’s technology and
instead offered reasoning based on function, which simply compared
Aereo to a cable system, that cloud technology could possibly face a
flood of litigation.
However, as society relies on further technological advancements, developers have an added burden not to resemble older technologies, as the Court may not recognize the difference.
VIII. CONCLUSION
While it remains to be seen whether Cloud storage systems
will be liable for copyright infringement under Aereo, there are still
unanswered questions. While for the time being, the Court seemed to
place its toes in the water by giving some leeway to Cloud storage
systems, as technology develops, the Courts may not be able to rest
upon certain principles such as technological blindness or that many
cloud users actually have obtained copyrighted works stored in their
clouds legally.280 Many commenters on Aereo have suggested that
either Congress needs to develop legislation more rapidly to adapt to
the ever-changing technological climate, others feel as if the Courts
needs to implement an additional step in how to distinguish new
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technologies from older ones.281 The most promising change might
come from the Federal Communications Commission. In as late as
December 2014, the FCC released a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
which sets out to include platforms akin to Aereo in the list of entities
that may be able to apply for a § 111 compulsory license.282 However, there still has not been a ruling on the matter and any changes regarding licensing for Internet television providers may not come for
quite some time.
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